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I'l THE sr;PRF.M:S COURT OF Tl-IE STATE OF UTAH 
Tl-IE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
JOEY t1. WILLIAMS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 17330 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE qATl'RE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, JOEY M. \HLLIAI1S, appeals from a conviction 
of Robbery in the ~hird Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of 1Ttah. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant; JOEY M. WILLIAMS, was found guilty of 
Robbery, a Second Degree Felony, by a jury. The trial was 
conducted September 4th, 8th. and 9th, 1980, with the Honorable 
qorner F. Wilkinson, presiding. Appellant was sentenced on 
September 9, 1980, to serve an indeterminate term of not less than 
one year nor more than fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a 
new trial. 
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STAT"SMEN'T' OF THE FACTS 
The Holiday Oil Company service station at 3847 South 
Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County, was robbed during the evening 
of November 24, 1979. Mike Weaver committed the crime pursuant 
a plan designed by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department to 
charge Weaver's accomplice, Joey Williams, with a criminal offens 
This plan required Weaver to drive straight through a specified 
intersection if the robbery had occurred as planned or to make a 
turn at the intersection if the robbery had not taken place. 
(T. 20, 100, 106). In accordance with the plan, Weaver drove 
straight through the intersection after the robbery occurred and 
the vehicle was stopped by two sheriff's deputies. (T. 28, 107). 
Both occupants fled; Weaver was allowed to escape while Joey 
Williams, the defendant, was apprehended. (T. 28, 108). 
The robbery plan was devised after Weaver was appre~en~ 
for shoplifting at the ZCMI store in Cottonwood Mall. Upon quest 
in connection with the shoplifting charge Weaver said he would 
cooperate with law enforcement officials with regard to a robbery 
scheduled for that night. (T. 52, 96). Weaver was taken to the 
Holiday Sheriff's substation where several members of the Sheriff 
Department collaborated with Weaver to fonnulate a plan for the 
robbery. Weaver called Joey Williams while at the substation and 
that conversation was recorded. (T. 17, 97). The transcript oft 
tape was introduced into evidence at the trial. (T. 101). 
-2-
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During both the prosecutor's opening remarks (T.7) and 
the testimony of Mr. Weaver (T.34~ reference was made to an allegedly 
false statement secured from Mr. Weaver while he was in prison. 
These assertions, made in the presence of the jury, either directly 
or indirectly implied that counsel for the defense was instrumental 
in securing the perjorious statements. (T. 7, 34). The court 
denied two motions for mistrial (T. 41, 118) based upon these 
statements. The defense had given no indication that it intended 
to use these statements from Weaver. 
As a result of the attack on defense counsel by the pros-
ectuion, counsel moved to withdraw from the case. (T. 125). Defense 
counsel believed it would be necessary for him to testify about 
how the statements from Weaver were obtained. The court denied 
defense counsel's motion even though his continued representation 
of the defendant would be prejudicial to him because counsel's cred-
ibility had been attacked. A further attempt to clarify the 
relationship between Weaver and defense counsel was foreclosed when 
the court required that the defense make a motion to call the 
prosecutor as a material witness (T. 130) and then denied the 
motion. (!. 131). 
James Miller, an inmate at the Utah State Penitentiary, 
was called as a witness for the defense to establish that Weaver 
had cause to fear the members of the prison population. (T. 220). 
Miller acknowledged that he had been convicted of a felony and was 
presentlv serving time in prison, however, the purpose of his 
cestimony was to show that Weaver was generally disliked at the 
-3-
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prison. The prosecutor, on cross examination. inquired into the 
nature and the details of Mr. Miller's past criminal activity. 
(T. 222-223). Defense counsel objected to this line of inquiry, 
however the objection was overruled. (T. 222-223). 
During closing arguments the prosecutor improperly 
invited the jurors to consider what might have happened had the 
victim of the robbery been injured. This argument was allowed by 
the court. (Closing Argument, T.4) The prosecutor rebutted an 
argument by defense counsel that Weaver had a motive to lie by 
pointing out that Weaver had a two year sentence to serve. Less t: 
one month later, Weaver was granted parole after the prosecutor 
personally appeared before the Board of Pardons and urged his ear: 
parole. (Board of Pardons, T. 5-7). The prosecutor asserted that 
Weaver's conduct during the trial had been so exemplary that he hi 
decided to use his efforts to get Weaver out of prison. (Board of 
Pardons, T. 5-7). 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S 
MOTION FOR A MISTFIAL WHEN THE PROSECUTOR 
INTRODUCED TESTIMOnY CONCERNING THE IMPEACH-
MENT OF THE STATE'S CHIEF WITNES.S BEFORE THE 
DEFENSE BAD EVER SOUGBT TO IMPEACH THE WITNESS. 
During his opening statement the prosecutor informed th< 
jury that the defense possessed a statement made by Michael Weaver 
that was inconsistent with what his trial testimony would be. Dei 
counsel objected to the reference because the alleged statement hi 
not been introduced into evidence, nor had Michael Weaver's cred-
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~ l 
ibility been attacked. The appellant asserts that the court erred 
in overruling his timely objection. 
It is well settled that the purpose of an opening statement 
in a jury trial is limited to a brief statement of the issues and 
an outline of what counsel believes he can support with the 
admissible evidence. A.B.A. Standards, The Prosecution Function and 
Th~ Defense Function, 119 (1971). The opening statement may not 
refer to particular evidence". unless there is a good faith and 
reasonable basis for believing that such evidence will be tendered 
and admitted into evidence." A.B.A. Standards, Prosecution and 
Defense Function, §3-5.5 (2nd Ed. 1979). 
In the present case the prosecutor, in his opening state-
ment, referred to a statement that was allegedly in the possession 
of defense counsel. 
The prosecutor told the jury that: 
[Michael Weaver] was, at one point in time, coerced 
into signing a statement which would indicate that 
Mr. Williams was not involved in a crime. Bear in 
mind that he did that under duress and coercion at 
the time because of the circumstances he was in. 
He will testify to the fact that he did sign this 
particular statement. This statement at the present 
time is in custody of the defense counsel. (T. 7) 
The prosecutor had no power over the introduction of the 
statement, and indeed, did not have any knowledge tnat the:statement 
would be introduced into evidence. Thus, his reference to the 
statement was clearly improper. 
-5-
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The Supreme ~curt of Vermont recently held that the tri 
court had erred by allowing the prosecution to make references to 
prior consistent statements of the principal prosecution witness 
its opening statement. l.Joodmansee v. Stoneman, 344 A. 2d 26 ( 1't. 
In that case the defendant was charged with assisting someone to 
avoid arrest and punishment for the crime of murder. The princip 
witness against the defendant had made several different statemen· 
during the investigation of the case. These statements were 
outlined in the prosecution's opening statement and were admitt~ 
during the prosecution's case. The prosecution argued that the 
statements should be admitted to rehabilitate a witness who had 
been impeached by a previous showing of "bias, interest or corrup 
Id.at 30. The court stated: 
The impeachment referred to, or the claim of recent 
continuance, can hardly be said to have transpired 
when the state made its opening argument. [t)he 
asserted purpose could not be a grounds for admiss-
ibility when [defense counsel] had not yet even been 
heard, much less introduced evidence. 
Id. at 30-31. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court faced a similar situation i 
Baker v. State, 69 Wis. 32, 33 N. W. 52, (1887). In that case the 
court said: 
In opening the case [the prosecutor) stated, 
in effect, that the accused would introduce 
testimony touching the character of the 
complainant, and as to what he tried to prove 
upon the former trial; but upon objection being 
made, the court promptly ruled that he must 
confine himself to stating to the jury the 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cause of the prosecution, but that he must not 
state the cause of the accused to the jury. 
Id. at 56. 
Courts recognize that the purpose of the opening statement 
is to orient the jury, so that they have a framework within which 
to analyze the evidence. In the present case the prosecution laid 
out this framework, then went further and told the jury of 
evidence he thought the defense would present. The prosecution was, 
in effect, anticipating the defense and attempting to defuse it at 
the start. This was clearly an improper argument which prejudiced 
the appellant by attacking the integrity of the defense counsel. 
The magnitude of the mischief occasioned by the prosecutor's 
character assassination of defense counsel is not easily palpable. 
However, the tip of the iceberg is at least recognizable when one 
considers that the purpose and effect of the prosecutor's broadside 
was to cast the defense counsel as an unscrupulous rogue wholly 
underserving of belief. Thus, as a result of the prosecutor's 
opening statement, before a shread of admissible evidence was 
before the jury, the appellant found himself beginning his trial 
with a lawyer which the prosecutor had painted as the picture of 
perfidy. 
POINT II 
DPFJ::NSV COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO 
WITHDRAW FROM THE CASE. 
(A) The court erred in denying defense counsel's motion 
to withdraw as counsel when he notified the court 
that it would be necessary for him to testify on 
behalf of the defendant. 
-7-
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The America~ Bar Association (A.B.A.) Code of Professic 
Ethics provides: 
DR 5-102 Withdrawal as counsel when the lawyer 
becomes a witness. 
(A) If, after undertaking employment in con-
templated or pending litigation, a lawyer 
learns or it is obvious tnat he or a 
lawyer in his firm ought to be called as 
a witness on behalf of his client. he 
shall withdraw from the conduct of the 
trial and his firm, if any, shall not 
continue representation in the trial. 
This rule is subject to certain exceptions not applicable in the 
present case. 
The A.B. A. committee set out the reasoning behind the 
rules under Canon 5 in the ethical considerations. In EC 5-9 
they state: 
Occasionally a lawyer is called upon to decide in 
a particular case whether he will be a witness or 
an advocate. If a lawyer is both counsel and 
witness, he becomes more easily impeachable for 
interest and thus may be a less effective witness. 
Conversely, the opposing counsel may be handi-
capped in challenging the credibility of the 
lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an 
advocate in the case. An advocate who becomes a 
witness is in the unseemly and ineffective 
position of arguing his own credibility. The 
roles of an advocate and of a witness are in-
consistent; the function of an advocate is to 
advance or argue the cause of another, while 
that of a witness is to state facts objectively. 
Ethical Consideration 5-10 provides in part: 
. where the question [of a lawyer becoming 
a witness] arises, doubts should be resolved 
in favor of the lawyer testifying and against 
his becoming or continuing as an advocate. 
In the present case the prosecutor, in his opening stac 
stated that his principal witness, Weaver, was coerced by the dei 
-8-
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1~t~ signing a statement inconsistent with what his trial testimony 
'.could be. He intimated that defense counsel had somehow played a 
role in obtaining this statement. (T.7) During the direct exam-
ination of Weaver the prosecutor's questions implied that defense 
counsel had approached Weaver and coerced him into signing a 
statement favorable to the appellant. (T.34) At this point defense 
counsel made a motion for a mistrial and a motion to withdraw from 
the case. 1 Defense counsel felt it would he in the best interests 
of his client for him to testify in order to rebut the prosecutor's 
insinuations. Counsel proposed to testify about the circumstances 
1Defense counsel endeavored to explain his motion in light of 
the aforementioned Disciplinary Rule and Ethical Considerations, but was 
met with some resistence from the court. Some time later, the court 
evidently realized the relevance of the rule, and then referred to it. 
MR. BUGDEN: EC 5-10 states--
THE COURT: Mr. Bugden, we are not going to read all the 
canons of ethics here today. 
MR. BUGDE~: Well, the next canon ii directly in point. 
THE COURT: 
THE COURT: 
It specifically says if there is any 
questions as to whether or not the lawyer 
should act as a lawyer or be a witness, 
all of those questions have to be resolved 
in allowing the lawyer to be a witness. 
In this case I have to be a witness to rebut 
the insinuation of the prosecutor and Mr. 
Christensen has to be a witness to rebut that. 
Mr. Bugden, just refer to the canon and don't 
take time to read it. (T.124) 
;'(' 
* * 
And are you going to call yourself as a witness? 
MR. BUGDEN: I haven't made that decision. 
THE COURT: Then it is my understanding as I remember some-
in the ethics that states if counsel takes 
the stand as a witness in the case he cannot 
proceed and argue the case. (T.134) 
-9-
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surrounding the receipt of Weaver's statements.2 Defense counsel 
also moved to call the prosecutor as a witness in order to show 
that he had been aware of the fact that Weaver had approached 
defense counsel wishing to help with the defense. 3 These motions 
were denied by the court. 
2MR. BUGDEN: At this time, Your Honor, I would also m~ 
a motion to withdraw from the case. I feel that after 
the remarks that Mr. Christensen had made in the recc 
for his honor, my state of mind is such that I truly' 
upset and I am now presented with cross-examining a 
witness who I am accused of [intimidating]. I am also 
accused of coercing his testimony or tampering with bi 
testimony. Of course, Mr. Christensen has made the sa 
insinuation to this Court. Obviously, this is the mos 
important witness for the case. The defense will not 
able to cross-examine this witness effectively. I 
would certainly be less than candid if I did not state 
for the record that I do not feel that I am in a posit 
now that I can go forward and vigorously cross-examin 
this witness. I truly am upset. I am shocked that Mr 
Christensen would make the accusation that he had abou 
I don't believe that I can ade~uately and competently 
completely defend Mr. Williams interests at this time 
(T. 44). 
3Mr. Christensen was aware that Weaver solicited the 
defense attorney first, not the defense attorney solic 
Weaver first. Yet he in opening statement insinuated 
the jury that I engaged in improper conduct by sending 
my investigators out to the prison to obtain a stateme 
And that is false. And the only way that can be rebut 
is if Mr. Christensen himself testifies in this case, a 
he must testify in this case. (T. 123). 
-10-
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Defense counsel should have been allowed to withdraw from 
the case and testify on behalf of the defendant. The general rule 
is that an attorney is competent to testify on behalf of his client. 
Am. Jur. Witnesses §152. In State v. Blake, 157 Conn. 99, 249 A.2d 
232 (1963), the defense counsel asked to withdraw so that he could 
testify as to a conversation he had with a prosecution witness 
prior to trial. ~he Connecticut Supreme Court said: 
[T]he Canons of Professional Ethics [do] not 
disqualify or render incompetent as a witness, 
an attorney who has participated in a trial; 
it is error to refuse to permit him to offer 
himself as a witness. [Citations Omitted]. 
Id. at 234. 
Similarly, where defense counsel in the present case asked to 
withdraw so that he could testify as to the circumstances surrounding 
obtaining Weaver's statement, such motion should not have been refused. 
In People v. Kuczynski, 23 Ill. 2d 320, 178 N.E. 2d 294 
(1961), the court reversed the defendant's conviction of armed 
robbery where the trial court had refused to allow defense counsel to 
withdraw and testify. At defendant's preliminary hearing a prose-
cution witness had been unable to identify the defendant, however 
at trial the witness testified that he had identified the defendant 
at the preliminary hearing. The Illinois court stated: 
As it is apparent that Schewe's testimony surprised 
defendant, the trial judge should have allowed 
defendant's attorney to testify. " Id. at 295. 
Although the TJtah Supreme Court has never spoken directly 
to this issue. they have accepted the theory underlying Canon 5 of 
the A. R. A. Code of Professional ~thics. In Galarowicz v. Ward, 
-11-
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230 P.2d 576 (Utah 1951), defense counsel called as a witness hi! 
co-counsel. Although co-counsel had participated in the trial, 
his role had been limited. Plaintiff's counsel objected to 
defense counsel being allowed to testify without withdrawing and 
the court overruled this objection. The court noted that the 
purpose of the rule: 
.is to avoid putting a lawyer in the obviously 
embarrassing predicament of testifying and then 
having to argue the credibility and effect of his 
own testimony. Id. at 580. 
The court went on tu note that the plaintiff's counsel was attempt 
to use the rule to disqualify competent counsel from continuing : 
the trial, and that the rule could not be used for such a purpos 
In the present case it was error to deny defense counsE 
motion to withdraw so that he could testify on behalf of his clie 
Defense counsel was surprised by the accusations of the prosecute 
and the testimony of Weaver and believed it essential to testify 
to rebut the prosecutor's innuendoes. In order to testify as a 
witness defense counsel desired to withdraw so that he would not 
have to argue his credibility and testimony to the jury. The cou 
erred in overruling defense counsel~ motion to withdraw. 
(B) Defense counsel should have been allowed to 
withdraw where his credibility had been 
attacked by the prosecutor. 
The trial judge refused defense counsel's motion to 
withdraw in the face of an attack on his integrity and credibilit 
by the prosecutor. The Supreme Court, in Berger v. United States 
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) stated: 
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The United States Attorney is the representative 
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but 
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation 
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore. 
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As 
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense 
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which 
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence 
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-
indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike 
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul 
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means 
to bring about a just one. 
In the present case the prosecutor struck foul blows. He 
implied that defense counsel had been instrumental in obtaining 
perjurious statements from a prosecution witness in order to aid 
his client. This assertion was calculated to influence the jury 
improperly. Accordingly, the trial court erred by not permitting 
defense counsel to withdraw. 
Although the Utah Court has never dealt with the issue 
of a prosecutor's misconduct in attacking defense counsel, several 
other courts have addressed it. In Watkins v. State, 140 Tenn. 1, 
203 S.W. 344 (1917), the Tennessee Supreme Court established the 
standard of conduct for a district attorney general: 
Imputation of dishonesty to adversary counsel 
in remarks addressed to them by the district 
attorney touching their conduct of the defense 
was an impropriety so gross that it must now 
appear to be such to the offical who gave the 
words utterance ... It was error not to sustain 
objection when interposed. Id. at 346. 
rhis standard was reiterated and followed in Dupree v. State, 410 
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S. W. 2d 890 (Tenn. 1967). When the facts of the present case are 
analyzed in light of this standard, it is clear that the prosecut 
attack on the integrity and credibility of defense counsel was 
improper. 
The Tenth Circuit Court recently examined the issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct in United States v. Jones, 578 F.2d 1332 
(10th Cir. 1978). The court first noted that in general it is " 
improper for the district attorney to imply that defense counsel 
has been involved in subornation of perjury. '' [Citations 
omitted] Id. at 1338. The court went on to hold, however, that 
where defense counsel had introduced and emphasized testimony 
that implicated him in an attempt to obtain a perjurious statemer 
the jury verdict would not be reversed. 
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Burse, 531 F.2d 
1151 (2d Cir. 1976) ,found that the prosecutor, in a trial for 
conspiracy to rob a federally insured bank, had implied improper 
purpose to defense counsel's questioning. The court noted that 
. successful - even zealous - prosecution does not require 
improper suggestions, insinuating and, especially, assertions of 
personal knowledge." Id. at 1155. The court reversed the case. 
In Weathers v. United States, 117 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1941) the 
defendant was convicted of sending abortion information through 
the mails. The prosecutor argued that: "It was plain to be seen 
that the defendant, or defendant's counsel or somebody, had gotte 
[sic] to this woman between the time she delivered that paper to 
and the time she was called to testify." Id. at 586. The court 
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;e 
that the argument " .was calculated to, and did, prejudice 
the rights of the defendant before the jury. lt was the duty of 
the trial court to have promptly excluded this improper argument 
and directed the jury not to consider it. Failing in this the court 
committed perjudicial error." [Citations omitted]. Id. at 586. 
In Carter v. State, Fla. App., 356 So. 2d.67, 1978, 
the rourt reversed the defendant~ conviction of robbery because 
of prosecutorial misconduct. During closing arguments the prose-
cutor attacked the defense attorney saying "she's trying to mislead 
you. That's her job. She's been appointed to be the defendant's 
mouthpiece, and she's done it." Upon objection the prosecutor 
explained "I'm not accusing her of anything, I said, 'almost', 
I'm not saying that she is." Id. at 67. Based upon this argument 
the court reversed the defendant's conviction. 
Similarly, in the present case the prosecutor attacked 
the integrity of the defense with wholly inadmissible evidence. 
The following colloquy demonstrates the character of the prosecutor's 
tactics: 
BY MR. CHRISTENSEN Q: When you saw this typewritten 
statement that was there to 
discredit and get Joey off the 
charges, did you ever receive 
a copy of that statement? 
BY MR. WEAVER A: For a couple of hours. 
Q: Hho gave you that copy initially? 
A: An investigator for the public 
defender's office. 
Q: What happened to that copy? 
A: They repossessed it. 
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Q: Did they tell you why? 
A: No. 
Q: Did they give you any indicat~ 
of why they were doing it? 
A: I assume it was incriminating. 
(T.39) 
The most logical conclusion for a juror to draw from 
this conversation is that defense counsel somehow tried to coercE 
the witness into signing a false statement to exculpate the 
appellant. 
As in Weathers, supra, the prosecutor's questioning wa1 
calculated to "prejudice the rights of the defendant before the 
jury." The questioning is aimed at directing the jury's thought: 
to the impropriety of defense counsel's actions, not the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant. The implication is that defense 
counsel had no case and thus must force a witness to perjure 
himself in order to manufacture a defense. Such trial tactics 
are shockingly improper. 
Defense counsel's testimony would have shown that Weav: 
voluntarily approached defense counsel desiring to aid in the 
defense of the appellant. Weaver first approached defense couns1 
the prosecutor was immediately notified of the conversation. Wh1 
defense counsel later approached Weaver to obtain a statement of 
the events he did so because of the insistence of Weaver on the 
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c 
earlier occasion.~ 
The jury could not fairly evaluate the case without 
'.zno,,-1ledge of the relationships between defense counsel, Weaver and 
the prosecutor. The testimony of Weaver should have been put in 
proper perspective; and the only persons who could do this were 
the defense counsel and the prosecutor. Thus, in view of the 
prosecutor's clearly improper argument, defense counsel should 
have been allowed to withdraw and testify as to the circumstances 
surrounding the statement in question. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO PERMIT DEFENSE 
COUNSEL TO CALL THE PROSECUTOR AS A MATERIAL 
WITNESS. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 7 provides: 
"Except as otherwise provided in these Rules or 
the Strttutes of this state, (a) every person is 
5MR. BUGDEN: I would submit to the court, proffer to the 
Court at this time; that prior to the time that 
~ike Weaver was incarcerated at the prison, prior 
to the time his parole was revoked, Mr. Weaver 
cal led me at mv office. . Mr. Weaver did in 
fact, make contact with me by telephone and told 
me in telephone conversation that he wanted to 
cooperate with the defense in this case, that he 
did not want to testify against Mr. Williams in 
this case, and testify on behalf of the State, and 
indicated to me that he was willing to make a 
statement that would be favorable to the defense 
in this case. 
I then immediately called Mr. Christensen and re-
lated to him that this man, his witness, Mr. Weaver 
had called me at my office. 
I then told Mr. Christensen that in fact, I was of 
the opinion that Mike Weaver was trying to set me 
up. (T. 121-123). 
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qualified to [sic] a witness, and (b) no person 
has a privilege to refuse to be a witness, and 
(c) no person is disqualified to testify to 
any matter. " 
Thus there isno statutory bar to defense counsel calling the pro 
cutor as a witness. 
The general rule is that a prosecutor is a competent 
witness. 149 A.L.R.1305. The Utah Supreme Court recognized thi 
rule in State v. Greene, 38 Utah 389, 115 P.181 (1910). Courts 
recognize, however, the problems inherent in calling the prosecu: 
as a witness for the defense. Thus, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court, in State v. Lee, 28 S.E.2d 402 (1943),refused to allow 
defense counsel to call the prosecutor where his evidence was me: 
cumulative. The Court also found that the trial court had dis· 
cretion to limit the number of defense witnesses called to estab 
a single point. The court noted, however: 
There is no statutory prohibition which prevents 
the calling of a prosecuting attorney by the 
defense as a witness, and generally speaking he 
is a competent witness to testify as to all 
relevant facts coming to his knowledge, except 
privile~ed communications. It is not believed that 
the rignt to call the prosecuting attorney as a 
witness for the defense would result in an 
inveterate practice. Else, it is readily seen 
that it might result in embarrassment in the 
due administration of justice. However, the 
constitutional guarantees of the defendant's 
(Const. 1895, Art. 1, Sec. 18) outweigh the 
evil which may be anticipated. Id. at 405. 
In the case at bar the prosecutor implied that defense 
had approached the prosecution's major witness and coerced him i: 
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signing a statement favorable to appellant. The prosecutor explained 
the circumstances under which Weaver was approached. "Mr. Weaver 
was incarcerated at the State Prison, he was in a rather precarious 
situation since he is now a state witness. He has had several 
threats made to him from prison inmates. . he [signed the 
statement] under duress and coercion at thetime because of the 
circumstance he was in." (T.7) 
Although the circumstances as described by Mr. Christensen 
u: were true, he failed to accurately describe the mole picture. 
Although Weaver was in prison at the time the statement was taken, 
he had approached defense counsel with an offer to help while he was 
e: free on bail and under no coercion. (T. 121-123) This added 
explanation changes considerably the import of Mr. Christensen's 
b. argument. It was, therefore, necessary for defense counsel to call 
Mr. Christensen as a witness so that he could elicit the missing 
circumstances surrounding the signing of the statement. 
i: 
In Chatman v. State, 334 N.E. 2d 673 (Ind. 1975), the 
Indiana Supreme Court noted that counsel should be subject to call as 
a witness when he ". is believed to have material information 
that cannot be otherwise disclosed." Id. at 682. In the present case 
the prosecutor alone could testify that defense counsel had contacted 
him concerning Weaver's desire to assist in the defense of Joey 
Hilliams. Moreover, by refusing to allow the appellant to call Mr. 
Christensen to the stand, the court denied the appellant his right 
to confrontation as protected by Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. Because the state was the beneficiary of this con-
3(il'~Lt:ional error, the State must bear the burden of proving beyond a 
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reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Chapman v. Califo: 
386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED BY PERMITTING THE P~OSECVTOR 
TO CROSS-EXAMDTE A DEFE?'TSE WITNESS ABOUT THE 
DETAILS OF HIS PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-24-9 (1953 as amended) provide, 
A witness must answer questions legal and pertinent 
to the matter in issue, although his answer may 
establish a claim against himself; but he need not 
give an answer which will have a tendency to subject 
him to punishment for a felony, nor need he give an 
answer which will have a direct tendency to degrade 
his character, unless it is to the very fact in 
issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer 
as to the fact of his previous conviction of a felony. 
In the present case the defendant called as a witness : 
Miller. Miller was an acquaintance of the appellant and Weaver: 
prison. Defense counsel asked Miller if he had been convicted 
of a felony, the nature of that felony conviction, and when the c 
viction was handed down. Defense counsel then proceeded to elic'. 
testimony as to Weaver's reputation at the prison for being a "sr 
and his need to fear the other inmates. On cross-examination thE 
prosecutor, over objection, asked Miller the specifics of his cm 
viction. He asked what he robbed and who he kidnapped and why h< 
had kidnapped someone. (T. 222-223). This was clearly an outra; 
Q: (BY MR. CHRISTENSEN) What did you rob? 
A: (BY MR. BUGDE~) He is not entitled to ask that qt 
* * * 
THE COURT: The Court would overrule the objection. 
* * A: (BY MR. MILLER) I beat up two guys and took thei: 
licenses and one of their wallets. 
Q: Who did you kidnap? 
A: Back in '79. 
Q: Who did you kidnap? 
A: This kid that I know. 
Q: You kidnapped a kid that you know? 
A: Yes. 
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Jf. 
qt 
i: 
line of questioning and should never have been condoned. 
The credibility of the witness had already been put at issue 
by his admission of a prior felony conviction. The only possible 
reason for the prosecutor's attack on this witness was to smear his 
character and to degrade him. This is the very mischief which the 
Utah Rules of ~vidence are designed to preclude. If such questioning 
was permitted many witnesses would balk at testifying knowing that 
any embarrassing incidents in their past might be dredged up and 
paraded before the jury. The effect of the prosecutor's degrading 
cross-examination was to portray the defendant's witnesses as 
"bad guys", a patently improper practice. 
This court announced its rule limiting the questions that 
could be asked about a prior felony conviction in State v. Johnson 
287 P. 909 (Utah 1930), citing 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, (10th 
Sd) p. 404. The court stated the general rule: 
A witness, as affecting his credibility, may be 
asked if he had not previously been convicted of 
a felony, and the kind or name of the felony, but 
not as to the details or circumstances of it. 
Q: Bow old was the kid? 
A: Eleven. 
Q: Did you hold him for ransom? 
A: No. Q: 1-Jhy did you kidnap him? 
A That is beside the point. 
[Objection by Mr. Bugden] 
The Court: The court is going to hold that the witness has 
been called and counsel has the right to attack the 
credibility of the witness and to go into the matters and 
I will overrule the objection. (T. 223) 
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This general rule has been scrupulously followed by 
the Utah Courts. In State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 332 P 2d 41 
(1963), the Supreme Court detailed the reasoning for such a rule 
The apparent purpose and reason for permitting the 
prosecution to question the accused regarding prior 
felony convictions is to affect his credibility as a 
witness. [Citations omitted]. However, the details 
or circumstances surrounding the felony or felonies 
for which the accused was convicted may not be 
inquired into except under unusual circumstances 
In the present case the witness was called for the lirr 
purpose of showing Weaver's reputation at the prison. Over the 
objections of defense counsel, the prosecutor proceeded to degra 
the witness by eliciting from him the specifics of the prior 
conviction. The court, however, overruled defense counsel's 
objection on the grounds that the prosecutor had the right to 
attack the credibility of the witness. (T. 223) 
The prosecutors questions clearly went beyond acceptab 
bounds. He was bent on vilifying the witness regardless of the 
limitations imposed by the Rules of Evidence. The prosecutor is 
at liberty to smear the character of the defense witnesses in or 
to strengthen his case. The court committed prejudicial error c 
permitting the prosecutor to sidestep the Kazda rule and debase 
witness with unabashed zeal. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING DEFENST<: COUNSEL'S 
OBJECTION TO THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS IN CLOSING 
ARGUMENT WHEREIN HE REFERRED TO INJURIES TO THE 
VICTIM WHICH WERE UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
-22-
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stated: 
During the course of his closing argument the prosecutor 
Bear in mind also up to what the impact would have 
been had Mr. Cassins Clark himself been injured or 
other "bitches" for victims. (T. Book 2 page 4) 
Defense counsel immediately objected to this line of argument, however 
his objection was overruled. There was no evidence introduced at trial 
that Mr. Cassins Clark had been injured. The appellant claims that 
such an argument prejudiced him and entitled him to a new trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court has never addressed the present 
issue, however other courts have. The Idaho Supreme Court, in State 
v. Spencer, 258 P.2d 1147 (Idaho 1953), held that an improper 
closing argument by a prosecutor was reversible error. In that case 
the defendant was convicted of second degree murder. During his 
closing argument the associate prosecutor referred to the grisly 
details of another murder. The prosecutor also made comments meant 
to "impress the jury to determine the case on factors outside the 
evidence." Id. at 1153. In reversing the defendant's conviction, 
the Idaho court held: 
Where the record shows that the prosecuting attorney 
has been guilty of misconduct calculated to inflame 
the minds of the jurors and arouse prejudice or passion 
against the accused by statements in his argument of 
facts not proved by evidence, the conviction will be 
set aside and a new trial granted. [Citations omitted). 
Statements of fact not in evidence by the prosecuting attorney in his 
argument to the jury may constitute prejudicial misconduct. 
[Citations omitted). Id. at 1154. 
In the case at bar the prosecutor's reference to what might 
hC'1e happened had Mr. Clark been injured was clearly meant to 
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"inflame the minds of the jurors and arouse prejudice or passior 
against the accused." Such an argument was totally improper. A 
defendant should not be convicted based upon the conjecture of 
what might have happened to the victim. 
The California Supreme Court has held that statements 
facts that are not in evidence constitute misconduct. In Peopl 
v. Kirkes, 249 P.2d 1 (Calif. 1952) the defendant was convicted 
of a murder that had occurred eight years before the trial. The 
state's chief witness was a woman who said she had seen the vict 
get into the defendant's car the night of the murder. This witn 
however, did not tell her story until the defendant had been ind 
eight years after the murder. 
"[T]he de-puty district attorney excused [the witness'] 
long silence by her asserted fear for her own safety 
if she testified against Kirkes. There is no evidence 
whatever upon which to base that statement. To pictur 
Kirkes as a murderer who would kill again to cover 
his crime and so bold that he had threatened those who 
might testify against him was entirely unjustified." 
Id. at 4-5. 
Based upon this improper argument the court reversed 
defendant's conviction. 
Similarly, in the present case, by asking the jury to 
consider 'what if Mr. Clark had been injured," the prosecutor was 
portraying the appellant as a ruthless person who would have 
maimed or injured at the slightest provocation. Such an argumen 
was highly prejudicial to the appellant. There was no evidence 
indicate that the appellant was in fact a ruthless criminal, the: 
the prosecutor's argument, wholly unsupported by the evidence, 
constituted misconduct. Because of the highly prejudicial natur 
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Jr. argument the appellant's conviction should be reversed. 
he 
:t 
In State v. Vickroy, 205 N.W. 2d 748 (Iowa 1973), the 
Iowa Supreme Court reversed the defendants conviction for drunk 
driving because of the prosecutors improper closing argument. The 
court noted: 
"Additionally, the prosecutor undertook to inflame 
the fears,passions and prejudice of the jury as 
against the defendant. This was done by inferentially 
urging the jurors to place themselves and members of 
their f arnilies in a hypothetical position of peril 
created by a drunken, [sic] car operating defendant." 
Id. at 751. 
The court found that such an argument prejudiced the defendant and 
tn' 
nd based upon this and other improprieties the conviction was reversed. 
ho 
0 
en 
he: 
ur 
The logic of the Vickroy case is just as compelling in the case at 
bar. 
POINT VI 
THE APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL AND 
DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE PROSECUTOR 
KNOWINGLY FOSTERED THE FALSE IMPRESSION THAT 
WEAVER WOULD STILL SERVE TWO YEARS IN PRISON 
EVEN THOUGH HE TESTIFIED FOR TRE STATE. 
During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that Weaver 
had a motive to lie because in exchange for this favorbale testimony 
the county attorney was willing to strike a generous plea bargain and 
dismiss two pending felony charges which both carried possible prison 
sentences. To rebut this argument the prosecutor asserted: 
Mr. Bugden seemed to highlight the fact that Mr. 
Weaver also has an incentive to lie here today, 
because he may [not] have to do the time, Mr, 
Weaver is doing the time. He's got two more years 
to do on his time. (T. 20) 
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Do rou think another Class A conviction would 
rea ly affect him that much out there at the 
State prison? Another year in jail at the 
prison? He is out there two years already. 
It is much more to his advantage to lie to you 
and say that Joey Williams wasn't involved. (T.23) 
Thus, the prosecutor asserted not only that Weaver had no reason 
to the jury, but that in spite of his cooperation with the State 
Weaver would serve two more years at the prison. 
Contrary to the prosecutor's assurances, Weaver did not 
spend the next two years in prison. In fact, Weaver was out of 
prison within one month after he had helped the appellant. One c 
the major factors behind Weaver's early parole was the prosecutor 
plea to the Board of Pardons. It appears that the prosecutor ah 
dismissed totally the charges that were pending against Weaver at 
the time of his participation in the appellant's trial. In testi 
before the Board of Pardons the prosecutor stated: 
"My way of assessing that, [Weaver's potential 
to society if he is released at some reasonable 
date in the future] of course, the trial a~ainst 
Joey Williams, which was an aggravated robbery charge. 
He could have backed out at anytime, and didn't. 
And as a result of the conviction that we got 
against Mr. Williams and at that point of time, 
I assessed with myself the type of character 
that I felt Mr. Weaver would be. And at that time, 
I -- on my own motion -- moved the court to dismiss 
the other charges against him. 
I didn't have to do that. The plea bargain was set. 
I could have insisted that he plead to another felony 
charge. Which I do not do. And it was based upon my 
assessment of him. Although I've only been a prose-
cutor for four years, I believe that my assessment is 
somewhat valid. And I feel Mr. Weaver is an asset. 
And Mr. Weaver recognizes his shortcomings and his 
shortfalls. He recognizes that his main problem has 
been the people he associates with. 
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I think that's going to change for him in the 
future. And Mike knows I'll go to bat for him 
one time. And he's the first person I've gone 
to bat for, because of the observations I've 
made in the court proceeding, and the struggle 
I watched him with. (Board of Pardons 
Transcript, 5- 7) 
Appellant contends that the inconsistent arguments of the 
prosecutor before the jury and before the Board of Pardons denied him 
both a fair trial and due process of law. During closing arguments 
the prosecutor asserted, more than once, that Weaver's testimony was 
believable because by so testifying he would be in danger during the 
next two years while inprison. However, one month later the prose-
cutor told the Board of Pardons that because of Weaver's conduct 
during the trial, he, the prosecutor, had decided to ask the court 
to dismiss all pending charges and to ask the Board of Pardons to release 
Weaver immediately. At the time of the closing argument the prose-
cutor either knew for certain, or strongly suspected, that he would do 
everything he could to get Weaver out of prison. Thus, his argument 
to the jury was grossly improper and constituted misconduct. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently considered a similar situation. 
InWalkerv. St~te, Case ~o. 16705, filed January 23, 1981, this 
court reversed the defendant'sconviction where the prosecutor exploited 
what he knew as a false impression in the minds of the jurors. In 
that case the defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of heroin 
with the intent to distribute for value. During a search of the 
living quarters above defendant's restaurant the police discovered 
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heroin. They also arrested a man who was sleeping above the 
restaurant at the time of the raid. Walker's defense at trial~ 
that she did not have exclusive use and control of the room where 
the heroin was found. She argued that the man had been using the 
room and that the heroin must have been his. 
The prosecutor presented evidence that rhe room in que' 
was locked at the time of the raid and that no ~en's clothing was 
found in the room. During the trial the prosecutor learned that 
man had been sleeping in the room and that his clothing was locat 
in that room.· The prosecutor. however. in closing arguments. sta 
that there was not evidence to support the defendant's contentio: 
that she did not have exclusive control over the room. 
In reversing the defendant's conviction this court stat 
"Whether or not the prosecution was aware of the fact 
this testimony was incorrect at the time it was given. 
he was later made expressly aware of that fact during 
the course of the trial. Yet, the prosecuting attorne: 
failed to disclose the contradicting testimony to the . 
plaintiff or the court. and instead deliberately relie: 
on the false impression created by the original testirnc 
in both his closing argument and summation to the jur;· 
We have previously stated that the State while charged 
with vigorously enforcing the laws "has a duty to not 
only secure appropriate convictions. but an even 
higher duty to see that justice is done. [Citation 
omitted]. In his role as the state's representative~ 
criminal matters, the prosecutor. therefore, must not 
only attempt to win cases. but must see that justice i: 
done. [Citation Omitted] Thus, while he should 
prosecute with earnestness and vigor. it is as much 
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated 
to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use 
every legitimate means to bring about a just one 
[Citation omitted]. 
-28-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
le 
UC 
ir 
Applying this standard to the present case, we 
believe their exists a reasonable likelihood 
the false imoression fostered by the prosecutor 
could have affected the judgment of the jury. 
Id. at 4-6. 
Similarly, in the present case, the prosecutor created 
a false impression before the jury. He argued that Weaver was 
believable because he had two more years to serve at the prison, 
and because his testimony was against his best interest. Yet one 
:nonth later; this same prosecutor argued for Weaver's immediate 
parole, an act which totally repudiated his remarks to the jury. 
This duplicity is in contravention of the standard laid down in 
State v. Adam, 583 P.2d 89 (Utah 1978) and Walker v. State, supra. 
As in Walker, there is a "reasonable likelihood the false impression 
fostered by the prosecution could have affected the judgment of the 
jury." Thus, the appellant's conviction should be reversed. 
• 
POINT VII 
THE APPELLAflT' S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WAS DENED 
BY THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE PROSECUTOR'S 
MISCONDUCT. 
Appellant submits that each of the errors in the preceding 
points constitutes prejudicial error that would require a reversal 
of the judgment of the court below. But these errors must also be 
considered to have had a cumulative effect on the outcome of the 
trial. The misconduct of the prosecutor was hardly confined to a 
single instance. Rather, the prosecutor's conduct was egregious from 
his opening remarks, throughout the trial, and during. his closing 
argumeni- From beginning to end Mr. Christensen exhibited conduct 
~~acreui-able for a prosecutor. The combination of the prosecutor's 
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insinuation that defense counsel coerced a false statement from 
Weaver; the court's refusal to allow defense counsel to rebut t~ 
innuendo by either testifying himself or calling the prosecutor 
to the stand; the unrestricted and unabashed character assassinat 
of defense witnesses; the prosecutor's reference in his closing 
argument to what might have happened had the victim been injured 
(where the evidence disclosed that the victim was uninjured); and 
the prosecutor's exploitation of the false impression that Weaver 
not get a "free ride" in return for his testimony because he woul· 
still be serving two years in prison operated to prejudice the 
appellant by denying him a fair and impartial trial. In Berger \' 
United States, supra, the United States Supreme Court held: 
We have not here a case where the misconduct 
of the prosecuting attorney was slight or confined 
to a single instance, but one where such mis-
conduct was pronounced and persistent, with a 
probable cumulative effect upon the jury which 
cannot be disregarded as inconsequential. Id. 
at 89. 
And so it was in the present case. The misconduct of t 
prosecutor was so "pronounced and persistent" that it requires tr 
reversal of defendant's conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the individual and 
cumulative errors stated herein require reversal of the jury verd 
and the judgment entered thereon. The appellant therefore asks t 
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Court to grant him a new trial in the Third Judicial District Court. 
DATED this _2.i_ day of May, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Walter F. Bugden, Jr. 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
~.AILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114 this ~-day 
of May, 1981. 
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